Introduction
All around the world, health policy makers are confronted with ageing populations and rising demands for long-term care (LTC) and are looking for ways to guarantee access to LTC services in a sustainable way. Barr (2010) argues there is a strong case for public provision of LTC insurance. And indeed, virtually all OECD countries have at least some publicly provided mandatory coverage against LTC expenditures.
Several of these countries (e.g. Belgium, Switzerland and the US Medicare and Medicaid programs) have integrated some "medical" LTC services in their public health insurance schemes. Other countries, e.g. the Netherlands (since 1968), Germany (since 1995), Japan (since 2000) and South-Korea (since 2002) , have a separate public LTC insurance scheme, Typically, if public LTC insurance is provided by public non-competing insurers, these agents are not at risk for the LTC expenses of their enrollees. As a consequence, these public insurers have no incentives for securing cost-effective provision of LTC services. Instead, governments have traditionally relied on demand rationing (e.g. copayments, coverage restrictions) and supply rationing (e.g. price regulation, provider budgets) to control expenditures in public LTC insurance (Costa-Font and Courbage 2012) . Both types of rationing, however, have important drawbacks, which are likely to be exacerbated by the expected increase in demand for LTC. Demand-side rationing may result in access problems for low-income individuals who need LTC; supply-side rationing may result in waiting lists and substandard quality of care.
An alternative or complementary strategy to increase the future sustainability of public LTC insurance is to provide public LTC insurers with incentives to foster efficiency and to control costs. To achieve this, public LTC insurers are made financially accountable for the LTC expenses of their enrollees and consumers are empowered to choose the most efficient LTC insurer. Introducing consumer choice and financial risk for LTC insurers, however, is likely to result in premium differentiation or, if for equity reasons risk rated premiums are not allowed, risk selection. Consumer choice and financial risk may thus reduce horizontal equity in financing and access to LTC services. Furthermore, this situation may lead to welfare losses resulting from resources employed for risk selection rather than for improving care, result in inefficient health plans that nonetheless survive and bring about lowerthan-desired quality of care (van de Ven and Ellis 2000) .
These negative side effects may be mitigated by risk-adjusted premium subsidies that ensure that each potential enrollee is equally attractive for insurers 1 . The combination of risk-adjusted capitation payments, community-rated premiums, and open enrollment to ensure competition among risk-bearing insurers in social health insurance markets, is known as managed (or regulated) competition (Enthoven 1988, Van de Ven and Ellis 2000) . Managed competition has become widespread in health insurance to balance efficiency and equity goals and knowledge on the prerequisites for its implementation in health insurance has been accumulated. .But managed competition has not been experimented with in LTC insurance yet. Only in countries where some (medical) LTC services are integrated within health insurance, i.e.
1 A system of risk-adjusted capitation payments will also be necessary if LTC insurance is carried out by regional single payers that are at risk for providing LTC to a defined population, e.g. regions/municipalities. But in this alternative scenario, a lower level of precision in predicting individual LTC expenses is required because risk selection is less relevant. Hence, the primary goal of these subsidies would then be to foster equity across regions or municipalities.
Belgium, Switzerland and the United States (Medicare), there is some experience with managed competition in LTC.
While risk adjustment in health insurance has been studied extensively, empirical research on risk selection and risk adjustment in LTC insurance is nearly nonexistent. 2 Definitions of LTC vary internationally. In this paper we focus on elderly care, which in the Netherlands (and elsewhere) accounts for the majority of total LTC expenditure covered by LTC insurance (CVZ 2011). Elderly care is defined as home care, social assistance, assistance with activities of daily living and inpatient stays in either a residential home or a nursing home. This definition comprises both "medical" and "non-medical" LTC: unlike in some other European countries, in the Netherlands there is no sharp distinction between medical and nonmedical LTC.
What is already known?
Unlike in LTC insurance, in health insurance risk adjustment is widespread. (Kautter et al. 2009 ).
Second, the relationship between health care use in the past, demographic characteristics and future health expenditures changes upon institutionalization and is different for those who were eligible for Medicare because of reaching the age of 65
and those who were eligible because they were disabled (Pope et al. 2004 ). This finding implies that risk adjusters should be interacted with institutionalization and age to reflect nonlinearity. 
Data and methods

Data
We use information from four nationwide administrative datasets and one survey which are all linked by Statistics Netherlands at the individual level (see de Meijer et al. (2011) for a more detailed description of the data). The administrative data include and except for LTC use, which is registered for adults only (≥ 18 years of age).
Furthermore, the records for one third of those eligible for sickness fund coverage cannot not be linked; item non-response on other variables was small (1.7% of the sample) and in all cases the result of missing co-residence status. As a result, the final sample consists of individuals who were insured through a sickness fund, did not die in 2004 and whose records could be linked to the municipality register. The total study population was 5,719,934, which is 45% of the Dutch adult population in 2004.
From this subset of the population, 7790 individuals were included in the 2004 POLS survey; 3619 of these respondents also completed the more specific health module.
Methods
We identify the extent to which a risk adjustment model can reduce incentives for risk selection in three steps. First, we identify the insurers' incentives to select against subgroups based on individual characteristics in the presence of community rating but in the absence of risk adjustment. In order to quantify the insurers' incentives for risk selection, we calculate the difference between the average actual costs by subgroup and the average costs of the entire population in 2005. We consider the incentives for risk selection to be strong when the number of users in the subgroup is substantial (> 300), the predicted loss for this group -the difference between observed and predicted expenditures -is large (> 1000 euro) and the predicted loss was significantly (p < 0.05) different from zero. When these criteria are met, the subgroup is included in the risk-adjustment model. (2000) and Pope et al. (2000) ). Subgroups that have a negative impact on the insurers' incentives for efficiency are removed in the incentive compatible risk adjustment model. This third step thus sheds light on the tradeoff between creating incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk selection.
Whether the predicted loss is stable over time -another common criterion for inclusion -cannot be assessed with the data set at hand. Moreover, all current Dutch risk adjustment models use OLS, so using OLS increases the comparability and compatibility of these models.
The subgroups based on detailed information on health status, disability and socioeconomic status from the POLS survey are too small to be included in the risk adjustment model. Instead, these subgroups are used as a benchmark to evaluate the impact of the risk adjustment model on incentives for risk selection. In addition to the subgroups based on prior HCE, we also create subgroups based on hospital admissions because information on hospitalization and diagnosis information may help to predict LTC use (Wong et al. 2010) . Subgroups are based on 94 diagnoses (based on a grouping algorithm of ICD-9 codes, see Polder et al. 2002) Furthermore, the impact of the DCGs on the incentives for efficiency is known to be limited while including all subgroups separately will provide incentives for oversupply and overreporting.
Variables
7 The assigned DCG does not match with the actual DCG for some individuals because of two limitations of the data set: 1. not all hospitals reported information on patients to the national medical registry; 2.information on two relevant 'side treatments', dialysis and artificial respiration at home was not available at all. As a consequence, DCG 13 (dialysis) is empty and the reference category consists of DCG0, DCG13 and patients who needed artificial respiration and should therefore be in DCG12. Furthermore, information on radiotherapy and chemotherapy was not specific enough to ensure that no patients who do not belong in the related DCG are excluded.
As the administrative data do not provide detailed information on personal characteristics, subgroups based on health, disability and socio-economic characteristics could only be retrieved from the smaller set of respondents that completed the POLS survey. Although it is much smaller and persons in nursing homes are not sampled, this survey information is important because it allows investigating incentives for insurers to use such questionnaires for risk selection (table 1) . This finding confirms that LTC expenditures are quite stable over time. Table 2 shows the subgroups derived from administrative data that are considered for the risk adjustment formula as well as the number of individuals in each subgroup.
Results
Descriptive statistics
[ Figure 1] [ 
No risk adjustment model
In case of community rated premiums but no risk adjustment, the predicted losses would be very large for subgroups based on prior LTC use or based on prior health care expenditures (table 2) 9 . These predicted losses, together with the large size of most of these subgroups (last column), signal that incentives for risk selection against these subgroups would be huge. Other results (available upon request) show that some diagnoses are indicators of a persistent loss: for four diagnoses that yield a large predicted loss in the next year, the predicted loss is still larger than 1000 euro two years later and three years later.
[ Table 2 ] 9 The appendix contains the predicted losses for the all subgroups that were included in the final model, 20 subgroups based on diagnosis from information on hospital admissions in 2004 and subgroups that were based on the POLS survey data; results for other subgroups are available from the corresponding author.
Demographic model
The results for the Demographic Model, which would adjust subsidies by age, gender and co-residence status of the enrollee, show that including demographic characteristics in the risk adjustment model does not sufficiently reduce the predicted losses for subgroups based on prior LTC use and prior HCE (table 2) . Therefore, it seems imperative to include the latter subgroups in the risk adjustment model to reduce incentives for risk selection.
Prior LTC model
Including variables on prior LTC use as risk adjusters by definition reduces the predicted losses on these subgroups to zero. But risk adjustment based on prior LTC use not only reduces predicted losses for prior LTC users but also for many subgroups based on prior HCE. In addition, this risk-adjustment model reduces the predicted losses for several subgroups of individuals who were hospitalized for diagnoses that were associated with the highest predicted loss without risk-adjustment (table 2) .
However, it does not substantially reduce the predicted losses for subgroups of LTC users that are not included, e.g. individuals who used LTC on the last day of the year.
Prior HCE and DCG model
Subsequently, we examined the effect of adding information on prior health care use and HCE patterns in the risk adjustment formula on the predicted losses. The predicted losses for the subgroups of insured that used LTC in 2004 all remain above the threshold of 1000 euro when DCGs are added to the model, along with variables indicating high expenditures (top 15%) on hospital and outpatient care for the last three and the last five years, and high expenditures on prescription drugs, transport, and durable medical equipment for the last year, the last three and the last five years (table 2) . But while these variables only have a small impact on the predicted loss for LTC users, including HCE is important for reducing the predicted loss for subgroups based on prior hospital admissions for several diagnoses, e.g. heart failure, and asthma and COPD. So whereas for some diagnoses, prior LTC use is more important in reducing the predicted loss, for other diagnoses prior HCE and DCGs causes the largest drop in the predicted losses.
Full model
When all information is combined in the full risk adjustment model, the predicted losses are reduced substantially for many of the subgroups we distinguished. For example, this full model reduces predicted losses sufficiently for all but seventeen diagnoses and for all but one type of treatment. Yet, including information on prior HCE and the variables on LTC use also leads to predicted profits larger than 1000 euro for two diagnoses: prostate cancer and chronic ulcers of skin including decubitus.
The initial predicted losses also vanish for the subgroups based on self-reported disability, health and socio-economic status all characteristics when prior LTC use and prior HCE are included in the risk adjustment formula. Although the loss is still larger than 1000 euro for subgroups unable able to perform at least one ADL, it is no longer significantly different from zero (table 2) .
Incentive compatible model
All subgroups based on prior LTC use and listed in table 3 are large and generate a large predicted loss in the absence of risk adjustment. Some of these subgroups are nonetheless excluded from the full model because their inclusion is expected to give insurers too strong incentives to overreport and oversupply. For example, the required additional spending for admitting a person for a single day in a nursing home (about 190 euro -see appendix) is much lower than the subsequent increase in the riskadjusted capitation payment of 11299 euro for the subgroup of people that are admitted to a nursing home for 1-90 days. Table 2 shows that when an individual uses LTC during a given year, in the next year the insurer would be compensated for most of the loss if risk adjustment were based on prior LTC utilization. In addition to affecting the insurer's incentives for efficiency, including prior expenditures also makes insurers insensitive to prices.
The trade-off between incentives for efficiency and incentives for risk selection is also relevant for some subgroups based on prior HCE and health care use. For DCGs and subgroups with high HCE in successive years the incentive problem is expected to be limited (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000). But for some subgroups, most notably individuals with high expenditures on transportation or medical equipment, the inclusion criteria are set at low levels because very few individuals use these services.
As a result, for these groups the minimum amount of expenditures is lower than the increase in the risk adjustment payment. Therefore, the subgroups based on only high expenditures in the previous year are omitted in the incentive compatible model. removing these risk adjusters did not only affect the predicted losses for the subgroups that were no longer included; but it also affected the predicted losses for subgroups based on hospital diagnoses and treatments and for the subgroups based on detailed survey information on health and disability. Yet, the impact on the predicted losses for these other subgroups was often fairly limited. Therefore, further reduction of the number of subgroups in the risk adjustment model may be considered.
Conclusion and discussion
In several countries public LTC insurance is offered by non-competing agents that are not at risk for providing coverage. This situation is suboptimal because it provides these agents with little or no incentive for efficiency and cost containment.
Transforming or replacing these agents by insurers that bear the financial risk is easy but might lead to socially undesired outcomes in terms of equity and efficiency in absence of adequate risk adjustment. We have investigated the scope for risk selection and the feasibility of a LTC risk adjustment formula that sufficiently reduces incentives for risk selection. Our findings demonstrate that a model that is only based on demographic characteristics performs poorly: subgroups that may be identified based on their prior LTC use, prior HCE or other individual characteristics yield a significant predicted loss to the insurer in case of community rated premiums.
Subsequently, we investigated the impact of 1) including individual-level information on prior health care and LTC use and 2) excluding risk adjusters that compromise insurers´ incentives for efficiency.
Not surprisingly, prior use of LTC services shows up as the best available predictor of future LTC use and hence its inclusion reduces incentives for risk selection substantially. Its main drawback is that it simultaneously reduces incentives for efficiency because insurers will be compensated for expenditures made in the preceding year. When more data on prior LTC use become available in the near future, the problem of reduced incentives for efficiency may at least partially be overcome by including indicators for having used (any) LTC for multiple years.
Next to prior LTC use, prior HCE and inpatient diagnosis and treatment information also prove to be vital: predicted losses persist for certain categories of HCE and for some inpatient diagnoses that occur mostly among the frail elderly even when prior LTC use is taken into account. These diagnoses probably indicate a negative health shock that causes the onset or intensification of formal LTC use. 
